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Notes
FUNERAL PROTEST BANS: DO THEY KILL
SPEECH OR RESURRECT RESPECT FOR THE
DEAD?
I. INTRODUCTION
In funerals across the country, protestors often fill the solemn air
with lyrics like the following:
First to fight for the fags
Now you’re coming home in bags
And the Army goes marching to hell
Proud of all of your sin
No more battles you will win
And the Army goes marching to hell
Chorus:
Then it’s I.E.D.s
The Army’s on its knees
Count off the body parts all gone (Two! Three!)
And where e’er they go
The dying soldiers show [(or) The crippled soldiers show]
That the Army keeps marching to hell!
Crimes you praise in your ranks
Getting blown up in your tanks
And the Army goes marching to hell
Hating God; coward’s hearts
Ziploc bags for body parts
And the Army goes marching to hell
(Chorus)
Serve a rag, God’s hate grows
See the tags on all your toes?
And the Army goes marching to hell
For a tyrant you fight
God destroys you with His might
And the Army goes marching to hell1

1
Westboro Baptist Church, http://www.godhatesfags.com/writings/patriotic_songs.
pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2007) (identifying the lyrics of the song titled “The Army Goes
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Members of the Westboro Baptist Church (“WBC”), led by Fred
Phelps, use songs like this one, along with placards, and flyers when
they protest at veterans’ funerals.2 Although the WBC’s message, that
God is punishing America for tolerating homosexuality, is not welcomed
by most Americans, it is their practice of choosing funerals to deliver this
message that has outraged the public at large and led government at all
levels across the country to respond with funeral protest bans.3 Since
2005, more than half the states proposed or passed funeral protest bans,
and even more are likely to draft similar legislation in the future.4 The
federal government responded as well, on Memorial Day 2006, when
President Bush signed the “Respect for Fallen Heroes Act,” setting time
and distance restrictions on protestors and demonstrations at military
funerals held in national cemeteries.5

Marching to Hell”). Similar songs have lyrics tailored for Marines, Navy members, and
homosexuals. Id.
2
Westboro Baptist Church, http://www.godhatesfags.com [hereinafter Westboro] (last
visited Sept. 19, 2007) (providing information, photos, video, audio, sermons, fliers, songs,
and picketing schedules for their organization and demonstrations).
3
Alan Phelps, Note, Picketing and Prayer: Restricting Freedom of Expression Outside
Churches, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 271, 272 (1999) (picketing in areas that typically are not used
for protests can draw more attention); David L. Hudson Jr., Overview Funeral Protests, Oct.
2006, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/assembly/topic.aspx?topic=funeral_protests
[hereinafter Hudson] (last visited Oct. 1, 2007). According to the National Conference of
State Legislatures, thirty-four states have introduced similar bills and twenty-seven of
those have passed them following in Kansas’ footsteps, including: Alabama, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and
Wisconsin. Id.; see also The Associated Press, Congress Votes to Restrict Protests at National
Cemeteries, May 25, 2006, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=16933
[hereinafter Associated Press 16933] (last visited Sept. 4, 2006) (noting that more than two
dozen states are considering restricting protests at non-federal cemeteries); Ronald K.L.
Collins, A funeral for free speech?, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, http://www.first
amendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=16775 [hereinafter Collins] (last visited Sept. 4,
2006) (stating that thirty-two states have passed or are considering similar laws).
4
Hudson, supra note 3. Federal Heroes Act calls states to act in Section Four: “It is the
sense of Congress that each State should enact legislation to restrict demonstrations near
any military funeral.” Respect for America’s Fallen Heroes Act, H.R. 5037, 109th Cong.
(2006); 38 U.S.C. § 2413 (2006); S. 421, 2006 sess. (Kan. 2006), available at
http://www.kslegislature.org/bills/2006/421.pdf; MO. REV. STAT. § 578.501 (West 2006)
(Kansas changed its statute after its first funeral protest ban failed in a court challenge by
WBC, and Missouri also passed two different versions of a ban).
5
38 U.S.C. § 2413 (prohibiting demonstrations or picketing within 300 feet of a national
cemetery for one hour prior to and one hour after a funeral, memorial service, or ceremony
with penalties that include a fine or prison up to one year or both); Associated Press 16933,
supra note 3 (explaining that the House Bill was first sponsored by Representative Mike
Rogers after he attended a protested military funeral in March of 2006); 10 KWTX, Bush
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Despite different political or religious views about the WBC, the Iraq
War, or homosexuality, the majority of Americans, as well as our courts,
have recognized that respect is owed to the dead, their burial places, and
to the privacy of their families.6 Although most Americans sympathize
with the families who have to endure WBC protests while trying to
mourn the loss of their loved ones, funeral protest bans raise serious First
Amendment concerns.7 As a result of the clash of constitutional rights
between protestors and mourners occurring at funerals across the
country, state legislatures are attempting to address and constitutionally
reconcile these newly passed bans.8

Signs Funeral Protest Ban, May 29, 2006, http://www.kwtx.com/home/headlines/
2890486.html [hereinafter 10 KWTX] (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
6
Phelps, supra note 3, at 286 (describing how many states have laws that ban
disruptions of religious services, such as funerals); Mary L. Clark, Treading on Hallowed
Ground: Implications for Property Law and Critical Theory of Land Associated with Human Death
and Burial, 94 KY. L.J. 487 (2005) (explaining how the law has recognized respect for the
dead and sanctity of land associated with death and burial, providing examples of property
law exceptions for places associated with death, and pointing to government creations of
cemeteries and memorials throughout history from the Civil War and Pearl Harbor
Memorial to the Arlington National Cemetery and now the World Trade Center sites).
Clark, a professor at American University Washington, has stated, “[e]very humane
instinct urges that the last resting place of the dead should be preserved from profanation,
and the desecration of such place should make a strong appeal to the conscience of the
court.” Clark, supra, at 497. Places of worship, like churches, have also been interpreted as
sacred spaces in America. Id. at 497 n.16.
7
See Hudson, supra note 3. Robert D. Richards, director of the Pennsylvania Center for
the First Amendment, stated that “[t]he rationale behind these laws is to stop an offensive
type of expression . . . but that’s the very type of expression the First Amendment continues
to protect.” Id. As First Amendment scholar Ronald K.L. Collins said, “[i]t is a simple
truth: The highest respect we can pay to our fallen war dead is to respect the principles for
which they made the supreme sacrifice. We honor them by honoring those principles of
freedom – even when a callous few vainly attempt to demean the dignity rightfully due
them.” Id.; see also The Associated Press, Anti-Gay Church Says It Won’t Violate New FuneralProtest Laws, Mar. 9, 2006, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=16614
[hereinafter Associated Press 16614] (last visited Oct. 1, 2007). WBC member Shirley
Phelps-Roper stated, “[w]e’re waiting until all the legislatures’ [sessions] are over to see
what tattered shreds they’ve left the Constitution in.” Associated Press 16614, supra. But
see The Associated Press, Officials Push for Illinois Law to Curb Protests Outside Funerals,
Jan. 1, 2006, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=16301 [hereinafter
Associated Press 16301] (last visited Sept. 4, 2007). As Army Staff Sgt. Jeremy Doyle’s
stepmother, Sandy Doyle, said, “[t]hey have a right to protest. That’s what our son died
for, but not at arm’s length . . . The families need to have some sense of security.” Id. Lt.
Governor Pat Quinn stated, “[a] hate group cannot use its right to speak hateful words to
cancel out and heckle and harass others who are seeking to exercise their First Amendment
rights to practice their religion, to assemble, and to speak in memory of someone very near
to them.” Id.
8
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000) (noting a privacy interest in avoiding
unwanted communication that changes in varying contexts); see also infra Part II.C
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Part II of this Note discusses the WBC as the leading impetus behind
the legislation, examines recently drafted state funeral protest bans,
provides an overview of the First Amendment issues, and considers
similar protest bans in other contexts.9 Building on this background,
Part III analyzes the constitutional strengths and weaknesses in the
drafting of these recent bans.10 Part IV proposes a model statute, based
on arguments from the analysis, as to how a funeral protest ban can be
constitutionally drafted to benefit states that pass a ban in the future or
those states that may need to alter their current legislation if it fails in
any future court challenges.11 Finally, Part V concludes that funeral
protest bans are rooted in the general public’s support for maintaining
the privacy and solemnity of funerals and mourners, as well as respect
for the dead, and that these bans, if carefully drafted, will likely survive
despite their constitutional challenges and provide the best remedy to
the clash of rights in this conflict.12
II. BACKGROUND
The main legal issue in this Note centers around whether recent
funeral protest bans violate the First Amendment.13 Part II.A provides
an overview of WBC and its tactics, as the WBC largely provided the
impetus for the legislation at issue.14 Part II.B examines current and
proposed state funeral protest bans.15 Part II.C provides the analytical
framework and precedent for First Amendment analysis.16 Finally, since
no court has ruled on the newly passed bans, Part II.D examines similar
speech restrictions in the abortion context, as well as older church related
cases, to examine how they fared in the court system and to provide
(providing a First Amendment overview of this issue) and Part III.A (analyzing the
constitutionality of the statutes).
9
See infra Parts II.A-D (providing background information about WBC, funeral protest
bans, and First Amendment analysis dealing with restrictions on speech).
10
See infra Part III (hypothesizing that most of the statutes are likely constitutional,
based on the analysis section of this Note).
11
See infra Part IV (providing a model statute that is content-neutral on its face, contains
clearly defined terms, is not vague or overbroad, sets reasonable distance and time
requirements, and is equally enforceable against all groups in violation).
12
See infra Part V (concluding that carefully drafted bans are the best remedy to this
issue).
13
U.S. CONST. amend I. The First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” Id.
14
See infra Part II.A (generally discussing WBC).
15
See infra Part II.B (discussing recently passed state funeral protest laws).
16
See infra Part II.C (providing the First Amendment framework for analysis).
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guidance as to how to draft a constitutional speech restriction.17
However, since neither the WBC nor mourning families will willingly
compromise their rights in this conflict, a constitutionally drafted ban is
the best way to resolve this conflict that the WBC began when it
protested its first funeral.18
A. Fred Phelps and the Westboro Baptist Church
Fred Phelps, the leader of the WBC, an independent Christian group
based out of Topeka, Kansas, is the primary impetus to the recent
legislation.19 The WBC has about one hundred members, most of whom
are related to Phelps either by blood or through marriage.20 Their main
belief and often-repeated message is that God is punishing the United
States for tolerating homosexuality.21 They use picketing and protest
demonstrations to voice this message.22 Although military funeral
protesting has gained them the most attention, WBC has also picketed at
See infra Part II.D (discussing similar restrictions in other contexts).
See infra Part V (concluding that a constitutionally drafted ban is the best remedy in
this conflict of rights); see also Associated Press 16933. Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist
stated, “[i]t’s a sad but necessary measure to protect what should be recognized by all
reasonable people as a solemn, private and deeply sacred occasion.” Associated Press
16933; see also Adriana Colindres, Bill Would Limit Protests at Military Funerals, SPRINGFIELD
STATE JOURNAL-REGISTRAR, Jan. 11, 2006, available at 2006 WL 666465 (quoting Lt. Gov. Pat
Quinn of Illinois, who said, “[n]o grieving military family should be subjected to vile
epithets and signs at the funeral service of their loved one who has made the ultimate
sacrifice for our country.”).
19
Westboro, supra note 2. Phelps has had a long history of political involvement, trying
to advocate his anti-homosexual message. Id. He gained national attention as the leader of
this controversial group in 1998 when WBC picketed the funeral of Matthew Shepard, a
homosexual hate crime victim. Id. His family, many of whom are lawyers like Phelps,
makes up a large portion of WBC members and takes an active role in demonstrations. Id.
Phelps was disbarred in 1979 in Kansas and has been arrested and charged with several
crimes. Id.
20
See generally Westboro, supra notes 2, 19.
21
Westboro, supra note 2. According to WBC’s beliefs, events and deaths caused by
9/11, the Iraq War, and Hurricane Katrina are punishments from God because the U.S.
tolerates homosexuality. Id.
22
Westboro, supra note 2. Past pickets have included gay pride gatherings, political
events, Starbucks openings, memorials for 9/11 and Sage Mine victims, and funerals of
homosexuals and veterans.
Id.
WBC posts a weekly picket schedule.
See
www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/Picket_Information.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2007). WBC
also provides several other websites where information about their beliefs and photos of
past demonstrations can be seen.
Westboro, supra note 2 (referencing
www.godhatesamerica.com, www.hatemongers.com, and www.thesignsofthetimes.net);
see also Judy Keen, Funeral Protestors Say Laws Can’t Silence Them[.] Their Belief: Troops Dying
Because USA Tolerates Gays, USA TODAY, Sept. 14, 2006, available at 2006 WL 15933998
[hereinafter Keen] (discussing WBC picketing for over fifteen years at schools, churches,
and funerals).
17
18
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non-military funerals and even hospitals and hotels in order to spread its
message and beliefs.23
WBC’s songs, messages on placards, and choices of places to protest
homosexuality have brought it media attention, criticism, and, now,
restrictive legislation.24 Since their first military funeral protest in June of
2005, WBC members have protested 162 funerals.25 Although their
tactics are controversial and the source of inspiration for funeral protest
laws, WBC members argue that their speech is protected and that the
bans are content-based violations of the First Amendment.26 Despite
Bob Von Sternberg, Funeral Protest Causes Furor Among Legislators, STARTRIBUNE, Feb.
24, 2006, http://www.startribune.com/587/v-print/story/269563.html [hereinafter
STARTRIBUNE] (last visited Sept. 4, 2006) (describing how WBC’s focus has changed from
protesting funerals of AIDS victims to funerals of soldiers); Collins, supra note 3 (noting
how WBC is expanding its picketing policy to hospitals of wounded soldiers); The
Associated Press, Lawmakers in 2 States Target Funeral Protests, Jan. 25, 2006,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=16354 (last visited Oct. 1, 2006)
[hereinafter Associated Press 16354] (stating that WBC would protest the funerals of West
Virginia coal miners); Keen, supra note 22 (describing how WBC targeted a hotel that had a
rainbow flag in Kansas). University of Kansas law professor Steve McAllister believes that
this legislation may benefit WBC by giving their message attention and possible legal fees if
they are successful in any constitutional challenges of these laws. Id.
24
See generally Westboro, supra note 2. The WBC pledge of allegiance states: “We pledge
allegiance only to God / And pray he destroys America / And all the people in the land /
More dead soldiers/ More lost limbs / Taking vengeance / On the disobedient / Bringing
His justice to all.” Id.; see also The Associated Press, Kentucky, West Virginia Join States
Trying to Bar Protesters From Funerals, Feb. 2, 2006, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/
news.aspx?id=16414 [hereinafter Associated Press 16414] (last visited Sept. 4, 2006)
(quoting Brandy Sacco, widow of a soldier, as saying “[t]hey choose to abuse these rights
by harassment of a grieving wife and family. Such a lack of common decency should not
be protected by law but punishable by the law . . . . The hardest thing I ever had to do in
my life was to listen to their nonsense.”); Molly McDonough, Picket Fencing: Laws Blunting
Church’s Protests Worry First Amendment Experts, 92 A.B.A. J. 16 (2006) [hereinafter
McDonough] (stating that their tactics include chanting songs and holding signs that say
“God Hates Fags” and that military funeral protesting since 2005 has given their message
more attention); Associated Press 16614, supra note 7 (citing Phelps-Roper, who, when
referring to states passing legislation restricting funeral protests, said, “[w]e’re thanking
them kindly. They drew a huge amount of attention to our message, and that’s all we’re
doing is delivering a message.”). See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, No. RDB-06-1389, 2006 WL
3081106 (D. Md. Oct. 30, 2006). In this case, Albert Snyder sued Phelps and WBC in the
U.S. District Court of Maryland for defamation, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and invasion of privacy due to the signs and protests at his son’s
funeral and statements made on WBC’s website. Id.
25
Keen, supra note 22 (using a figure that reflects WBC activity from June 2005 through
September 2006).
26
Hudson, supra note 3 (stating how WBC argues that the bills are content and
viewpoint based and violate First Amendment principles); The Associated Press, Missouri
Funeral-Protest Bill Sent to Governor, Feb. 23, 2006, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/
news.aspx?id=16532 [hereinafter Associated Press 16532] (last visited Oct. 1, 2006). Shirley
23
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new laws and unwelcoming communities, WBC members believe they
have been successful in getting their message across.27 The Patriot
Guard Riders, a group of motorcyclists who oppose WBC picketers at
funerals, and local public figures have taken matters into their own
hands and have tried to address WBC’s funeral protesting in their own
ways.28 In addition, other remedies to curb funeral protesting include
using the tort system or enhancing already existing disturbing the peace
statutes.29 However, since WBC members feel strongly about their
message and First Amendment rights to continue picketing, funeral

Phelps-Roper said, “[t]hey’re going to give away rights that they claim these soldiers have
died for? They’re going to spit in their graves – for what? Some words?” Associated Press
16532, supra.
27
See generally Keen, supra note 22. WBC pickets as many as three funerals a week and,
since August of 2006, has targeted fifteen funerals in thirteen states. Id.
28
Associated Press 16614, supra note 8. The Patriot Guard Riders are a group of
motorcyclists who attempt to overshadow the anti-gay protestors with flags, patriotic
messages, and chants. Id. See Keen, supra note 22 (noting that there are 53,000 Patriot
Guard Riders nation-wide); Ryan Lenz, Motorcyclists Roll to Soldier Funerals to Drown Out
Protestors, STARTRIBUNE, Feb. 21, 2006, http://www.startribune.com/484/v-print/
story/260171.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2007). As Kentucky Patriot Guard Rider, Dan
Woodrick, stated, “[w]hen a total stranger gets on a motorcycle in the middle of winter and
drives 300 miles to hold a flag, that makes a powerful statement.” Lenz, supra; see also
Jacques Steinberg, Air Time Instead of Funeral Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, at A14. Talkradio show host Mike Gallagher approached the matter somewhat differently—by giving
WBC almost an hour of air time on October 5, 2006, for their written promise not to picket
the funerals of five young girls killed that week in their Pennsylvania school by a gunman.
Steinberg, supra. See also McDonough, supra note 24 (stating that legislation alone is
unlikely to stop WBC protestors who are very cautious and notify law enforcement and the
media in advance, follow directions, and agree on a time and location for their protest
demonstrations). But see Associated Press 16614 (explaining that WBC cancelled funeral
demonstrations in Indiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin in March of 2006, all of
which had new funeral protest legislation).
29
See Snyder, 2006 WL 3081106 (discussing the Snyder lawsuit’s claims of emotional
distress due to WBC protesting). However, suits are time-consuming and costly. See
Funeral Protest: Court Asked For Repayment, YORK DAILY RECORD, Aug. 30, 2006,
http://www.ydr.com/portlet/article/html/fragments/print_article.jsp?article=425993
(last visited Sept. 4, 2006) (stating that it took Snyder more than twenty times to serve WBC
with fees of almost $6,000 and that he filed a motion to recover those fees in a federal
defamation suit against WBC for protesting his son’s March funeral); McDonough, supra
note 24, at 16 (noting how, according to experts, if the bans enhance disturbing the peace
statutes and are narrowly drafted they are more likely to be upheld). Although these
options may be less intrusive on speech, funeral protest bans will be more effective and put
the burden of bringing a lawsuit on the protestors like the WBC. But see Alan K. Chen,
Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment Overbreadth, and Improper Legislative Purpose, 38
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 90 (2003) [hereinafter Chen] (“Continuing First Amendment
doctrine on its current path will inevitably lead to more superficially neutral attempts to
target speech regulations.”).
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protest bans, if constitutionally drafted, are the most effective way to
resolve this conflict of rights.30
B. Current State Funeral Protest Bans
The funeral protest bans recently passed in many states, within a
relatively short time, are the result of legislative concern about protecting
the privacy of mourning families and preventing emotional distress at
funerals caused by any protestors.31 Support for these bills crosses party
lines, which allows them quick passage.32 Most of the protest bans
include distance and time requirements surrounding funeral
demonstrations, as well as serious punishments against violators that
include hefty fines and even jail time.33 To provide a sampling of
legislation and different tactics states have used, the following key states
are first generally discussed and then later compared: Kansas, Indiana,

30
McDonough, supra note 24. Shirley Phelps-Roper has stated, “[i]f we were standing
out there with signs that say, ‘God Bless America,’ we would not be having this
conversation.” Id.; 10 KWTX, supra note 5. WBC members held signs that said “Thank God
for Dead Soldiers” and “Bush killed them” three hundred feet away from Arlington
National Cemetery on Memorial Day, 2006, when Bush signed the “Respect for America’s
Fallen Heroes Act.” 10 KWTX, supra note 5.
31
See The Associated Press, Indiana Enacts Funeral-Protest Law, Mar. 3, 2006,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=16584 (last visited Oct. 1, 2007)
(quoting Indiana Senator Brent Steele, who said “I have heard from thousands of Hoosiers
on this issue and they almost unanimously feel this is the right thing to do for the families
of our fallen heroes and the funerals of all Hoosiers.”); The Associated Press, South Dakota
Governor Signs Bill Restricting Funeral Protests, Feb. 14, 2006, http://www.firstamendment
center.org/news.aspx?id=16475 [hereinafter Associated Press 16475] (last visited Oct. 1,
2006) (citing South Dakota’s House Speaker Matthew Michels’ reference to mourning
family members: “We are free because these people have fought and died for
us. . . . Everybody’s entitled to protest, but you are not entitled to cause grief upon grief.”).
See generally Hudson, supra note 3.
32
38 U.S.C. § 2413. The Act was introduced in the House on March 29, 2006; considered
and passed on May 9, 2006; considered in the Senate and presented to the President on
May 25, 2006; and signed on Memorial Day, 2006, with a total of 207 co-sponsors (99
Democrats and 108 Republicans). Id. See generally Part II.B (describing similar cross-party
sponsorship and expediting of bills as seen in the states); The Associated Press, Iowa
Governor Signs Bill Restricting Funeral Protests, Apr. 18, 2006, http://www.firstamendment
center.org/news.aspx?id=16779 (last visited Sept. 4, 2006) (noting that the Iowa Governor
enacted the law one day before a planned funeral picket by the Westboro Baptist Church);
Associated Press 16532, supra note 26 (explaining that the Missouri bill took effect as soon
as the Governor signed it); Associated Press 16301, supra note 7 (stating that no one testified
against the funeral protest legislation in the Indiana committee hearing, and it was
endorsed unanimously).
33
See infra notes 35-53 and accompanying text.
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Illinois, Wisconsin, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Maryland, Ohio, Florida, South
Dakota, Missouri, and Kentucky.34
Kansas, WBC’s home state, is one example of a state that already had
a law banning funeral demonstrations, but it was ultimately found
unconstitutionally vague.35 The newly enacted bill, passed almost a
decade later, bans picketing and protest marches within 300 feet of a
funeral service, except for public places within the buffer zone, for one
hour before and two hours after the funeral service, and violations are a
misdemeanor.36 Similar distance and time restrictions were enacted in
other states.37

See infra notes 35-53 and accompanying text.
Associated Press 16354, supra note 23; The Associated Press, Legislators Propose Bills
Barring Protests at Funerals, Nov. 14, 2005, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/
news.aspx?id=16064 [hereinafter Associated Press 16064] (last visited Sept. 4, 2006). In
Kansas, a 1995 law prohibiting similar protesting outside of funerals was found to be too
vague. Associated Press 16064, supra. However, by later including time restrictions, a
similar law was enacted. Id.; see also Hudson, supra note 3 (referring to the same law and
stating that Phelps challenged a Kansas Picketing Act in the 1990s that later was ruled by a
federal judge as unconstitutionally vague because of its terms “before” and “after” a
funeral instead of specific time restrictions).
36
Associated Press 16532, supra note 32; Kan. S. 421. The bill, as of October 7, 2006, read:
(1) ‘‘Funeral’’ means any ceremony, procession or memorial service in
connection with the death of a person.
(2) ‘‘Picketing’’ means protest activities engaged in by a person or
persons stationed before or about a cemetery, mortuary, church or other
location where a funeral is held or conducted within one hour prior to,
during and two hours following the commencement of a funeral.
(e) It is unlawful for any person to:
(1) engage in picketing or a directed protest march at any public location
within 300 yards of any entrance to any cemetery, church, mortuary or
other location where a funeral is held or conducted within one hour prior to,
during and two hours following the commencement of a funeral; or
(2) obstruct or prevent the intended uses of a public street, public sidewalk or
other public space while engaged in picketing or a directed protest, as
described in subsection (1).
Kan. S. 421 (emphasis in original). Punishment for violators may include a Class B
misdemeanor and assessment of damages and attorney fees. Id.
37
See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., H.R. 1382, 2006 Leg. (Colo. 2006),
available at http://www.leg.state.co.us/clics2006a/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/CDF6B09F14AF6C
658725713300592865?open&file=1382_enr.pdf (stating that Colorado sets 100 foot
restriction); S. 1833, 169th Leg. (N.C. 2006), available at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/
Sessions/2005/Bills/Senate/HTML/S1833v4.html (explaining how North Carolina sets a
300 foot restriction one hour before, during, and one hour after); H.R. A2870, 212th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2006), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/PL06/
93_.PDF (establishing that New Jersey has a 500 foot restriction immediately prior to,
during, and after a funeral service); H.R. 97, 79th Leg. (Tex. 2006), available at
34
35
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For example, on March 2, 2006, the Indiana legislature enhanced its
disorderly conduct statute to make picketing within 500 feet of a
cemetery or burial a Class D felony.38 Similarly, Illinois prohibits
protests, even visual images conveying fighting words, within 300 feet of
any facility used for funeral services.39 In Wisconsin, as of February 20,
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/793/billtext/pdf/HB00097F.pdf (noting how,
similarly, Texas has a 500 foot restriction from one hour before to one hour after a service).
38
Hudson, supra note 3; Associated Press 16584 (stating that it is disorderly conduct to
protest within 500 feet of a funeral, procession, burial, or viewing, punishable as a felony
offense with six months to three years in prison and a $10,000 fine); see also IND. CODE § 3545-1-3 (2006), available at http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2006/SE/SE0005.1.html.
The statute states:
(a) A person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally:
(1) engages in fighting or in tumultuous conduct;
(2) makes unreasonable noise and continues to do so after being
asked to stop; or
(3) disrupts a lawful assembly of persons; commits disorderly
conduct, a Class B misdemeanor
....
(c) The offense described in subsection (a) is a Class D felony if it:
(1) is committed within five hundred (500) feet of:
(A) the location where a burial is being performed;
(B) a funeral procession, if the person described in
subsection (a) knows that the funeral procession is taking
place; or
(C) a building in which:
(i) a funeral or memorial service; or
(ii) the viewing of a deceased person; is being
conducted; and
(2) adversely affects the funeral, burial, viewing, funeral
procession, or memorial service.
IND. CODE § 35-45-1-3 (2006).
39
Hudson, supra note 3; Associated Press 16301, supra note 7 (describing the Illinois
Governor’s signature of the statute “Let Them Rest in Peace Act,” which bars
demonstrations within 200 feet of funerals shortly before, during, and after services); see
also H.R. 0772, 94th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2006), available at
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?Name=094-0772. The Act states:
(b) For purposes of this Section:
(1) “Funeral” means the ceremonies, rituals, processions, and
memorial services held at a funeral site in connection with the
burial, cremation, or memorial of a deceased person.
(2) “Funeral site” means a church, synagogue, mosque, funeral
home, mortuary, cemetery, gravesite, mausoleum, or other place
at which a funeral is conducted or is scheduled to be conducted
within the next 30 minutes or has been conducted within the last
30 minutes.
(c) A person commits the offense of disorderly conduct at a funeral
or memorial service when he or she:
(1) engages, with knowledge of the existence of a funeral site, in
any loud singing, playing of music, chanting, whistling, yelling,
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2006, individuals are prohibited from loud protests or displaying visual
images that convey fighting words within 500 feet of a funeral from one
hour before to one hour after a funeral.40 Nebraska introduced an
amendment expanding its state’s anti-picketing law to include any
picketing within 100 feet of any funeral being conducted.41 Similarly, an
Oklahoma act signed into law on March 6, 2006, prohibits protests
within one hour prior and two hours after funerals.42 In Maryland,
or noisemaking with, or without, noise amplification including,
but not limited to, bullhorns, auto horns, and microphones within
200 feet of any ingress or egress of that funeral site, where the
volume of such singing, music, chanting, whistling, yelling, or
noisemaking is likely to be audible at and disturbing to the
funeral site;
(2) displays with knowledge of the existence of a funeral site
and within 200 feet of any ingress or egress of that funeral site,
any visual images that convey fighting words or actual or veiled
threats against any other person; or
(3) with knowledge of the existence of a funeral site, knowingly
obstructs, hinders, impedes, or blocks another person’s entry to or
exit from that funeral site or a facility containing that funeral site,
except that the owner or occupant of property may take lawful
actions to exclude others from that property.
Ill. Pub. Act 094-0772 (Ill. 2006). A violation of the statute results in a Class C
misdemeanor. Id.
40
Hudson, supra note 3; S. 525, 2005 Leg. (Wis. 2005), available at http://www.legis.state.
wi.us/2005/data/acts/05Act114.pdf. The Wisconsin bill states:
947.011 Disrupting a funeral or memorial service.
(1) In this section:
(a) “Facility” includes a cemetery in which a funeral or
memorial service takes place.
(b) “Funeral or memorial service” includes a wake or a burial,
as defined in s. 157.061 (1), but does not include a service that is
not intended to honor or commemorate one or more specific
decedents.
(2) . . .
(a) No person may do any of the following during a funeral or
memorial service, during the 60 minutes immediately preceding
the scheduled starting time of a funeral or memorial service if a
starting time has been scheduled, or during the 60 minutes
immediately following a funeral or memorial service:
1.
Engage in conduct that is prohibited . . . within 500 feet
of any entrance to a facility being used for the service with
the intent to disrupt the service.
2.
Intentionally block access to a facility being used for the
service.
S. 525, 2005 Leg. (Wis. 2005).
41
Hudson, supra note 3.
42
Id.; see also S. 1020, 50th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2006), available at http://webserver1.lsb.
state.ok.us/2005-06SB/SB1020_int.rtf. Oklahoma’s law states, in part:
B. The purposes of this section are to:
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House Bill 850 would ban funeral protests within an hour prior to the
funeral, making it a crime to obstruct mourners from funerals or burials,
and making violations a misdemeanor.43 Finally, Ohio bans picketing or
any other protest activity within 300 feet of a funeral for one hour before
and after a funeral.44 The aforementioned states exemplify the current
trend in legislation.
Some state legislation, however, has caused more controversy.45 For
example, Florida uses more general language and punishes anyone who
1.
Protect the privacy of grieving families within one hour
prior to, during and two (2) hours following the commencement
of funerals; and
2.
Preserve the peaceful character of cemeteries, mortuaries
and churches within one hour prior to, during and two (2) hours
following the commencement of funerals.
C. As used in this section:
1.
“Funeral” means the ceremonies, processions and memorial
services held in connection with the burial or cremation of the
dead; and
2.
“Picketing” means protest activities engaged in by a person
or persons within five hundred (500) feet of a cemetery, mortuary
or church within one hour prior to, during and two (2) hours
following the commencement of a funeral.
S. 1020, 50th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2006). Violations may carry a fine up to $500 dollars, jail
up to thirty days, or both. Id.
43
Associated Press 16532, supra note 26; see also H. R. 850, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md.
2006), available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2006rs/bills/hb/hb0850f.pdf. The Maryland
law provides:
(A) A person may not, for 60 minutes immediately preceding a
funeral, burial, memorial service, or funeral procession that has a
scheduled starting time, or during the 60 minutes immediately
following a funeral or memorial service:
(1) Knowingly obstruct, hinder, impede, or block another
person’s entry to or exit from the funeral, burial, memorial
service, or funeral procession; or
(2) Display a visual image that conveys fighting words against
another person within 500 feet of:
(i) An entrance to a funeral, burial or memorial service; or
(ii) A funeral procession.
(B) A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and
on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 90 days or a
fine not exceeding $1,000 or both.
H. R. 850, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2006).
44
H.R. 484, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005), available at
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/bills.cfm?ID=126_HB_484_RS. The bill specifies:
[N]o person shall picket or engage in other protest activities, nor shall
any association or corporation cause to be picketed picketing or other
protest activities to occur, within three hundred feet of any residence,
cemetery, funeral home, church, synagogue, or other establishment
during or within one hour before and during or one hour after the
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“willfully interrupts or disturbs” a military funeral with a misdemeanor
charge.46 On February 13, 2006, South Dakota signed a bill prohibiting
picketing likely to cause emotional distress to a grieving family within
1,000 feet, one hour before to one hour after a funeral service.47 South
Dakota’s distance requirement is one of the most extreme.48 Similarly, in
conducting of an actual funeral or burial service at such that place. No
person shall picket or engage in other protest activities, nor shall any
association or corporation cause to be picketed picketing or other
protest activities to occur, within three hundred feet of any funeral
procession. As used in this section, “other protest activities” means
any action that is disruptive or undertaken to disrupt or disturb a
funeral or burial service or a funeral procession.
Id. (underlining and striking as it appears in the bill to reflect the final version passed).
45
See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
46
H.R. 7127, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006), available at http://www.myflorida
house.gov/Sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=PCB%20MVA%2006-01.pdf&
DocumentType=Proposed%20Committee%20Bills%20(PCBs)&Session=2006&CommitteeId
=2257.
The Florida bill states:
(2) Whoever willfully interrupts or disturbs any assembly of people
met for the purpose of acknowledging the death of an individual with
a military funeral honors detail pursuant to 10 U.S.C. s. 1491 commits a
misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082
or s. 775.083.
Id.
47
S. 156, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2006), available at http://legis.state.sd.us/sessions/
2006/bills/SB156HST.pdf. It provides:
Section 1. No person may engage in any act of picketing at any funeral
service during the period from one hour before the scheduled
commencement of the funeral services until one hour after the actual
completion of the funeral services. Any violation of this section is a
Class 2 misdemeanor. Each day on which a person violates this section
constitutes a separate offense.
Section 2. Notwithstanding the criminal penalties provided in section 1
of this Act, thecircuit court may enjoin conduct proscribed by section 1
of this Act and may in any such proceeding award damages, including
attorney fees, or other appropriate relief against any person who is
repeatedly found guilty under this Act.
Section 3. For the purpose of this Act, the term, picketing, means
protest activities engaged in by any person stationed within one
thousand feet of a funeral service within one hour prior to, during, and
one hour following the commencement of any funeral service.
Section 4. For the purposes of this Act, funeral services are any
ceremony, procession, or memorial held in connection with the burial
or cremation of a deceased person.
Id.; see also Associated Press 16475, supra note 31. The South Dakota legislature passed the
law in only a couple of hours and included language that made it effective upon the
Governor’s signature in order to cover upcoming funerals that week. Associated Press
16475, supra note 31.
48
S.D. S. 156 (setting South Dakota’s distance restriction at 1,000 feet).
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Missouri, the governor signed the state’s first protest ban in February
2006, but later signed a second law, as a preventative measure, to get
around any potential future lawsuits since the first ban did not specify a
certain distance, making it susceptible to a possible vagueness
challenge.49 Finally, Kentucky signed a law on March 27, 2006, that bans
protestors within 300 feet of funerals, burial services, and memorial
services.50
To summarize the preceding sampling of legislation, distance
requirements ranged from 100 feet in Nebraska, to 300 feet in Kansas,
Associated Press 16532, supra note 32. The newer ban expands the definition of a
funeral to cover them no matter where they are held and sets a distance limit of 300 feet
from funeral proceedings. Id. Otherwise, it is similar to the previous ban and has the same
time limit of sixty minutes before and after a funeral. Id.; see MO. REV. STAT. § 578.501
(West 2006).
1. This section shall be known as ‘Spc. Edward Lee Myers’ Law.’
2. It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in picketing or other
protest activities in front of or about any location at which a funeral is
held, within one hour prior to the commencement of any funeral, and
until one hour following the cessation of any funeral . . . .
3. For the purposes of this section, “funeral” means the ceremonies,
processions and memorial services held in connection with the burial
or cremation of the dead.
MO. REV. STAT. § 578.501; see also infra note 68 and accompanying text (likening the
Missouri statute to those of Wisconsin, Ohio, and South Dakota).
50
H.R. 333, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2006), available at http://www.lrc.ky.gov/record/
06rs/hb333.htm. The statute, as of October 10, 2006, provided:
(1) A person is guilty of interference with a funeral when he or she at
any time on any day:
(a) Blocks, impedes, inhibits, or in any other manner obstructs
or interferes with access into or from any building or parking lot
of a building in which a funeral, wake, memorial service, or burial
is being conducted, or any burial plot or the parking lot of the
cemetery in which a funeral, wake, memorial service, or burial is
being conducted;
(b) Congregates, pickets, patrols, demonstrates, or enters on that
portion of a public right-of-way or private property that is within
three hundred (300) feet of an event specified in paragraph (a) of
this subsection; or
(c) Without authorization from the family of the deceased or
person conducting the service, during a funeral, wake, memorial
service, or burial:
1.
Sings, chants, whistles, shouts, yells, or uses a bullhorn,
auto horn, sound amplification equipment, or other sounds
or images observable to or within earshot of participants in
the funeral, wake, memorial service, or burial; or
2.
Distributes literature or any other item.
Id. Violation is a Class B misdemeanor. Id.; see Hudson, supra note 3; Associated Press
16414, supra note 24 (remarking on how Kentucky senators expedited the bill).
49
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Illinois, Ohio, Missouri, and Kentucky, to 500 feet in Indiana and
Wisconsin; and even to 1,000 feet in South Dakota.51 There were
differences in time restrictions as well.52 For example, Kansas and
Oklahoma restricted protesting one hour before and two hours after a
funeral service, while Wisconsin, Ohio, South Dakota, and Missouri only
restrict for one hour before and after.53 Unlike the common time
restrictions in most states, Kentucky’s is an example of a ban with a
vague time restriction, stating “at any time on any day.”54 Penalties
range from violations constituting a misdemeanor, in Kansas, Maryland,
and Kentucky, to a Class D felony in Indiana.55
Beyond differences among the states, some states even differ from
the Federal Heroes Act.56 Although the Federal Heroes Act is limited to
military funerals because of jurisdiction issues, it can still serve as sample
legislation for states that ban protests at all funerals.57 The Heroes Act
distance requirement bans protestors 300 feet from a national cemetery
or 150 feet from a route of ingress or egress to the cemetery.58 Its time
restriction is one hour before to one hour after a funeral, memorial
service, or ceremony.59 The penalty can be up to one year in prison, a
fine, or both.60 Having compared and contrasted the bans, it is obvious
that the states and their legislation are not uniform and that many even
differ from the federal bill.61
The lack of uniformity among state bans may be attributed to
legislatures acting too quickly and it foreshadows the need for a model
statute.62 One commentator stated, “[b]ut to see a news article one day
and have a law enacted shortly thereafter makes it look as though little

See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 34-50 and accompanying text.
53
See supra notes 34, 36, 40, 42, 44, 47, and 49 and accompanying text.
54
See supra note 50. The author believes this is a drafting weakness.
55
Compare supra notes 33, 36, 42, 43, and 46-48 and accompanying text, with supra note 38
and accompanying text (noting, for instance, that Oklahoma has a $500 fine or 30 days in
jail and Maryland sets a $1,000 fine and 90 days in jail).
56
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
57
Associated Press 16933, supra note 3.
58
38 U.S.C. § 2413.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
See supra notes 31-60 and accompanying text.
62
Dean Mundy, Funeral Protest Law is Misguided, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 19, 2005,
http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=408970 (last visited Sept. 4, 2006) (arguing
that legislators should wait before quickly enacting a law to see how big of a problem they
are actually addressing).
51
52
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thought or study are being done.”63 The constitutional issues that these
laws raise may be taking a back seat to public policy concerns, but such
issues will eventually rise to the surface through court challenges.64 Both
WBC and the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) plan to
challenge these laws.65
In fact, Kentucky and Missouri are the first states to face
constitutional challenges to their statutes in court.66 As previously
stated, both states have distance requirements of 300 feet.67 Missouri
restricts protesting for one hour before and after a funeral.68 However,
Kentucky’s restriction is vaguer, stipulating “at any time on any day.”69
In addition, Kentucky has a very broad and encompassing definition of
Id.
Collins, supra note 3 (arguing that whether funeral protest bans violate the First
Amendment is being overlooked in the recent trend of federal and state laws); STAR
TRIBUNE, supra note 23. Chuck Samuelson, executive director of the Minnesota American
Civil Liberties Union stated, “[w]e generally don’t like these things and part of me says
leave [him] alone and he’ll go away. But this is not a constitutional issue, it’s a public
policy issue.” STAR TRIBUNE, supra note 23; see also Worldwide Religious News, Judge
Temporarily Suspends Funeral Protest Ban, Sept. 27, 2006, http://www.wwrn.org/
article.php?idd=22859&con=4&sec=36 (last visited Oct. 1, 2007) (describing how U.S.
District Judge Karen Caldwell temporarily suspended Kentucky’s funeral protest ban,
reasoning: “[t]he zone is large enough that it would restrict communications intended for
the general public on a matter completely unrelated to the funeral as well as messages
targeted at funeral participants.”).
65
McDonough, supra note 24.
66
The Associated Press, ACLU Lawsuit Challenges Kentucky Funeral-Protest Law, May 2,
2006, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=16841 (last visited Oct. 1,
2007). On May 1, 2006, the ACLU filed a federal lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in
Frankfort, Kentucky, challenging the new state law that prohibits protestors within 300 feet
of funerals, memorial services, wakes, and burials, as well as preventing the use of
bullhorns; punishable as disorderly conduct and up to a year in jail. Id.; see Phelps-Roper v.
Nixon, No. 06-4156-CV-C-FJG, 2007 WL 273437, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 26, 2007) (involving a
complaint against Missouri statute sections 578.501-502, of which section 578.502 is a
backup that is to become effective if subsection 501 would be held unconstitutional, even
though its only difference from the former version is that it changes “in front of or about”
language to “three hundred feet”). Phelps-Roper is claiming that the statutes infringe on
individual speech, religious liberty, and assembly rights, arguing that they are
unconstitutional, and is seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting
enforcement of the statutes, citing a “lack of clarity about what speech is criminal” and
complaining that the WBC is “chilled in their efforts to engage in protected speech
activities inspired by their religious beliefs.” Complaint at 2, Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, No.
06-4156-CV-C-NKL, 2007 WL 2515872 (W.D. Mo. July 21, 2006).
67
Ky. H.R. 333, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 578.501; see also supra
note 51 and accompanying text (noting that other states that have 300 foot distance
requirements include Kansas, Illinois, and Ohio).
68
MO. REV. STAT. § 578.501; see also supra note 52 (noting other states that have time
restrictions of one hour before and after, including Wisconsin, Ohio, and South Dakota).
69
Ky. H.R. 333, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2006).
63
64
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picketing and protest activity.70 A court may find both of these vague
sections within the Kentucky statute problematic.71 Although Missouri’s
statute shares common threads with many other states, its legislature did
anticipate problems, leading to the passage of its most recent statute with
the 300 foot distance requirement as “backup” legislation in case the
previous language of “in front of or about” would be held
unconstitutionally vague.72
These constitutional challenges and
legislative concerns require an overview of First Amendment doctrine.
C. First Amendment Overview
Funeral protest bans implicate the First Amendment by restricting
speech.73 Although WBC and its tactics do not garner much public
support, they may find all the support they need in the First
Amendment.74 First Amendment analysis is always wary of the
“slippery slope” when restricting speech.75 As Tony Rothert, an ACLU
member stated, “[t]oday it’s a group we don’t like. Tomorrow it could
be us that [sic] are silenced.”76
The First Amendment protects offensive and repugnant speech.77
However, the First Amendment does not provide an absolute right to
speech.78 First Amendment challenges can address whether a speech

Id.; see also infra note 168 (providing similar Texas code definitions).
Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 192 F.3d 1176 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding a vague and overbroad
anti-picketing ordinance unconstitutional). See generally infra Part III.A.3 (providing
analysis of overbreadth and vagueness doctrine).
72
See supra note 66 (discussing Missouri’s backup legislation); Phelps-Roper v. Nixon,
No. 06-4156-CV-C-FJG, 2007 WL 273437, at *1, *4 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 26, 2007) (noting plaintiff’s
allegations that Missouri statute sections 578.501 and 578.502 infringe on speech, religious
liberty, and assembly rights are targeted at WBC’s message, are vague, are not narrowly
tailored, and convey information about time and routes that are not posted in a manner
that allows for compliance).
73
See generally supra notes 8 and 13 and accompanying text (providing constitutional
arguments as well as the text of the First Amendment).
74
STARTRIBUNE, supra note 23 (reporting on how the general public and hosts of a
Minnesota radio show publicly condemned a recent WBC protest for hours on end); Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000) (stating: “The fact that the messages conveyed by those
communications may be offensive to their recipients does not deprive them of
constitutional protection.”).
75
See generally Keen, supra note 22.
76
Id.
77
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that wearing a jacket that said “Fuck
the Draft” in a courthouse to protest the Vietnam War was constitutional because offensive
words are protected by the First Amendment).
78
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) (declaring that the freedom
of speech and association are not “absolutes”); Collins, supra note 3 (holding that
70
71
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restrictive law targets a certain group or content, argue that a restriction
is not a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, facially challenge
vague or overbroad terms, or try to characterize the forum.79
Determining whether a speech restrictive law is content-based or
content-neutral on its face sets the standard for analyzing the law.80 If a
law is content-based, meaning the subject matter, message, or particular
idea is restricted, it must satisfy strict scrutiny to survive a First
Amendment challenge.81
Strict scrutiny requires a compelling
government interest and narrowly tailored means.82 Strict scrutiny is a
heavy burden to satisfy and typically requires that the regulation is
necessary to achieve a compelling interest that cannot be achieved
through any less intrusive means.83
If a law is content-neutral, however, the government only has to
meet intermediate scrutiny, which is a lesser burden and merely requires
an important government interest and means that are no broader than
necessary.84 Under intermediate scrutiny, the regulations must be
narrowly tailored to serve a significant interest.85 Further, if a law is
government can regulate noise, obstruction, disorderly conduct, trespassing, crowd size,
threats, and fighting words, even in the funeral context).
79
See infra notes 80-93 and accompanying text; see also Part III.A (analyzing the
constitutional strengths and weaknesses in current statutory and regulatory drafting).
80
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (holding that if a restriction on speech is contentbased, it must meet strict scrutiny with a compelling government interest and narrowly
tailored means); Hudson, supra note 3 (quoting Robert D. Richards’s statement: “Given that
the expression at issue, ‘funeral protest,’ could easily be interpreted as a content-based
restriction, the government will likely have a tough time defending the restriction.”).
81
Turner Broad. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994); Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content.”). ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1054 (2d ed. 2005).
82
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); Barry, 485 U.S. at 312.
83
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (it would be unlikely that
the funeral protest bans, if content-based, would survive strict scrutiny). But see Freeman
v. Burson, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (upholding a content-based distance restriction around
polling places because protecting the right to vote satisfied strict scrutiny).
84
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989) (“So long as the means chosen
are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest, however,
the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government’s
interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative.”);
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at 1054. Intermediate scrutiny requires an important
government interest. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at 1054. In order to be content-neutral, a
speech regulation must be viewpoint neutral and subject matter neutral. Id. at 1058.
85
Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980) (stating that the
level of scrutiny for time, place, and manner restrictions requires that alternative channels
of communication are also left open).
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content-neutral, government can limit speech with reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions, which would allow the government to
regulate speech even in a public forum, such as the sidewalks and streets
around a funeral or cemetery.86
In addition, laws can be facially challenged because of their
vagueness or substantial over-breadth.87 A law is unconstitutionally
vague if it is ambiguous and a reasonable person cannot tell what speech
is allowed or prohibited.88 Similarly, a law is unconstitutionally
overbroad if it regulates substantially more speech than the Constitution
allows and is unconstitutional when applied to others.89 If facial
challenges such as these are successful, the entire law is invalidated.90
Finally, since the type of forum where the speech takes place affects
the level of scrutiny, it is necessary to examine the places where laws are
trying to regulate speech.91 Public forums, such as sidewalks and parks,
86
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (holding that a statute regulating speech within
one hundred feet of the entrance to any health care facility is a valid time, place, and
manner regulation that is content-neutral, narrowly tailored, and leaves open alternative
channels of communication); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984)
(holding that protestors could not sleep in the park); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Consol. Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 535-36; see also
Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (restricting noise and disruptions around schools
in session); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (restricting sound devices on trucks);
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at 1356-57 (citing Hill, 530 U.S. 703, in which the Court upheld
various regulations creating buffer zones around abortion clinics as reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions). But see United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983). In that case,
the Court declared a speech restriction on the public sidewalks around the Supreme Court
building unconstitutional because a total ban on speech was unnecessary to further the
goal of preventing disruption of court proceedings. Id.
87
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (finding that an ordinance
was overbroad because it prohibited all forms of live entertainment); Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (holding that a particular ordinance was vague because
there was an unascertainable standard and broad because it punished protected conduct
and speech, making it facially invalid).
88
Coates, 402 U.S. at 611; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at 1085.
89
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at 1087.
90
Id. at 1084.
91
Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 44 (1983); Dep’t of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92 (1972) (holding that government regulation of speech in public places must be
content-neutral or else it has to meet strict scrutiny); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at 1342
(“[T]here generally is no right to use private property for speech purposes . . . there is no
state action, and the Constitution does not apply”); Phelps, supra note 3 (stating that courts
first look at the location of the protestors); Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX.
L. REV. 581, 584 (2006) (referring to free speech, buffer, and protest zones used around
abortion clinics, political conventions, campuses, and funerals). “Governments have
learned to manipulate geography in a manner that now seriously threatens basic First
Amendment principles.” Zick, supra.
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are government property that the government must make available for
speech.92 However, the government can still regulate speech in a public
forum, as long as the regulation is content-neutral and is a reasonable
time, place, and manner restriction.93
D. Similar Speech Restrictions in Other Contexts
Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, like the recent
funeral protest bans, have been challenged in court in other contexts and
thus are helpful to examine, since a court has yet to rule on the
constitutionality of a funeral protest ban.94 Several Supreme Court
abortion cases regarding buffer zones and restrictions around clinics
provide helpful insight into how a court may analyze the
constitutionality of funeral protest laws.95 These cases provide helpful
tools to construct a model statute, by providing language, distance, and
time restrictions that have been upheld and the Supreme Court
reasoning behind its decisions.96
In Hill v. Colorado,97 a 1993 Colorado law required protestors who
were within one hundred feet of an abortion clinic to stay eight feet away
from any person who was entering or exiting the clinic.98 The Court
found that the statute was a content-neutral place regulation and upheld
the law as constitutional.99 Similarly, in Madsen v. Women’s Health
Center,100 the Court found that a thirty-six foot buffer zone in front of a
clinic that prohibited any protest or demonstration was constitutional.101
However, in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y.,102 the Court held
that a fifteen foot “floating” buffer zone around any vehicle or person
entering or leaving a clinic was unconstitutional.103 The Court reasoned
92
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988) (stating that public streets and sidewalks are
traditional public forums).
93
See infra Part II.D (discussing similar speech restrictions in other contexts).
94
See infra notes 95-110 and accompanying text.
95
See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 703; Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357
(1997); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); Frisby, 487 U.S. 474.
96
See infra Part IV (offering a model statute based on Part III’s analysis).
97
Hill, 530 U.S. at 703.
98
Id. (reasoning that the law was a valid time, place, and manner restriction and that it
was narrowly tailored and allowed enough alternative channels of communication).
99
Id. (reasoning that the right to access a health facility was an important interest).
100
Madsen, 512 U.S. at 753.
101
Id.
102
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 357 (1997).
103
519 U.S. 357, 377 (1997). “We uphold the provisions imposing ‘fixed bubble’ or ‘fixed
buffer zone’ limitations, as hereinafter described, but hold that the provisions imposing
‘floating bubble’ or ‘floating buffer zone’ limitations violate the First Amendment.” Id. at
361.
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that this was overbroad since it could apply to protestors on public
sidewalks and curbs and would be very hard to enforce.104
One final abortion case revolves around residential picketing.105 In
Frisby v. Schultz, anti-abortion protestors targeted a doctor’s home and
wanted to picket on the public street outside of his house.106 The Court
held that the city ordinance restricting residential picketing was
constitutional, despite lower courts’ holding and a strong dissent by
several Justices.107 The Court relied heavily on the privacy of the home
and the fact that the residents are “captive audiences” in their homes.108
Although not as persuasive as the Supreme Court reasoning in the
abortion context, two lower court cases from the 1990’s regarding
picketing outside of churches are helpful for analyzing the recent funeral
protest bans.109 In St. David’s Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church,
a church filed a petition to stop WBC from picketing around its property
before, during, and after religious events.110 The Kansas Court of
Appeals affirmed a thirty-six foot buffer zone around the church to the
east, west, and north and 215 feet to the south from thirty minutes before
to thirty minutes after an event, reasoning that protecting a person’s
place of worship is a legitimate government interest.111

Id. at 379 (“[W]e conclude that the floating buffer zones burden more speech than
necessary to serve the relevant governmental interests.”).
105
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
106
487 U.S. 474, 476 (1988). The ordinance stated: “It is unlawful for any person to
engage in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual in the
Town of Brookfield.” Id. at 477.
107
Id. at 488. The lower courts found that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored. Id. at
478. However, the Supreme Court more narrowly interpreted the ordinance to only
include a single house and not a whole residential area and also to only include those
listeners who could not avoid the speech. Id. at 482-88. But see id. at 494 (Brennan, J.
dissenting) (arguing that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored and the city could go
back and change the ordinance to only regulate the “number of residential picketers, the
hours during which a residential picket may take place, or the noise level of such a
picket”).
108
Id. at 487 (majority opinion). “Because the picketing prohibited by the Brookfield
ordinance is speech directed primarily at those who are presumptively unwilling to receive
it, the State has a substantial and justifiable interest in banning it.” Id. at 488.
109
See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text. Since there has yet to be precedent
directly on point drawing inferences, even from state and lower federal courts, provides
some helpful information as to how courts may look at the recent funeral protest bans.
110
St. David’s Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, 22 Kan. App. 2d 537 (1996).
111
Id. at 551-52. St. David’s sued to stop picketing within thirty-six feet of the church to
the east, west, and north and 215 feet to the south for thirty minutes before to thirty
minutes after religious events like services, weddings, and funerals. Id. at 540. According
to the Kansas Appellate Court, “the right of free exercise would be a hollow one if the
104
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In contrast, in Olmer v. City of Lincoln,112 the Eighth Circuit held that a
city ordinance restricting picketing outside religious places, with the
same thirty-minute time restrictions as in St. David’s, was
unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored.113 The court
found that the ordinance banned speech directed at adults and not just
children (who were the city’s main interest when making the regulation)
and prohibited more speech than just that speech that damaged
children.114
The different stances and reasoning of the Supreme Court on similar
restrictions in the abortion context, as well as lower court reasoning in
the religious context, leave legislatures unsure of how to draft valid
legislation and whether or not their laws will withstand constitutional

government could not step in to safeguard that right from unreasonable interference from
another private party.” Id. at 549.
112
Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 192 F.3d 1176 (8th Cir. 1999).
113
Id. Here, anti-abortion picketers targeted an abortion doctor’s church, where he was a
deacon, to protest his practices. Id. The city argued that their ordinance was a valid time,
place, and manner restriction and relied on the interests of protecting children at church
who were exposed to the picketing, preserving the right of citizens to practice their
religion, and maintaining public safety. Id. at 1180. The ordinance defined picketing as:
[T]he act of one or more persons stationing herself, himself or
themselves outside religious premises on the exterior grounds, or on
the sidewalks, streets or other part of the right of way in the immediate
vicinity of religious premises, or moving in a repeated manner past or
around religious premises, while displaying a banner, placard, sign or
other demonstrative material as part of their expressive conduct.
Id. at 1179 (quoting LINCOLN, NE. MUNI. CODE tit. 9, ch. 20, § 090(a)(3) (Sept. 21, 1998)
(repealed)). The ordinance further stated:
It shall be deemed an unlawful disturbance of the peace for any person
intentionally or knowingly to engage in focused picketing of a
scheduled religious activity at any time within the period from onehalf hour before to one-half hour after the scheduled activity, at any
place:
(1) on the religious organization’s exterior premises,
including its parking lots; or
(2) on the portion of the right of way including any sidewalk
on the same side of the street and adjoining the boundary of
the religious premises, including its parking lots; or
(3) on the portion of the right of way adjoining the boundary
of the religious premises which is a street or roadway
including any median within such street or roadway.
Id. (quoting LINCOLN, NE. MUNI. CODE tit. 9, ch. 20, § 090(a)(3) (Sept. 21, 1998) (repealed)).
114
Id. at 1180 (“The ordinance purports to make the carrying of signs at the indicated
times and places unlawful, no matter what the signs say or depict, and this prohibition is
much broader than necessary . . . .”).
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challenges, thus demonstrating the need for a model statute.115 State
funeral protest bans are designed to balance the competing rights
between protestors and mourners.116 The First Amendment protects
speech, and precedent in other contexts sheds light on how such
legislation should be drafted in order to survive future court
challenges.117 The strengths and weaknesses in the drafting of current
bans are analyzed below.118
III. ANALYSIS
Part III applies the background information to determine whether
the state funeral protest bans violate the First Amendment rights of
protestors and what the proper balance of rights should be in current
and future legislation.119 First, this Part analyzes the constitutionality of
the bans by discussing content-neutrality, reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions, vagueness and overbreadth, and forum.120 Then, it
exposes the strengths and weaknesses of the funeral protest bans by
drawing on similar restrictions in other contexts.121
A. Are State Funeral Protest Bans Constitutional?
Recently passed state funeral protest bans implicate several
constitutional concerns, including: content-neutrality, vagueness and
overbreadth, and the scope of reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions. Although the bans have similar features, components, and
drafting (each include items such as distance buffer zones, time
restrictions, and penalties), the lack of uniformity among those features

See supra Part II.D. Compare Hill (530 U.S. 703), and Madsen (512 U.S. 753) (upholding
the constitutionality of protest restrictions at one hundred feet, thirty-six feet, and an eight
foot buffer zone), with Schenck (519 U.S. at 377, 379), and Olmer (192 F.3d at 1180) (declaring
a fifteen-foot floating buffer zone unconstitutional and holding a restriction too broad since
it regulated all forms of speech). See infra Part III.B (comparing state bans to the speechrestrictive bans from other contexts).
116
See supra Part II.B (providing a discussion of state bans and the reasons behind their
enactments).
117
See supra Parts II.C and II.D (discussing First Amendment analysis and case law in
other precedents).
118
See infra Part III (analyzing the constitutionality of state funeral protest bans).
119
See infra Parts III and IV (analyzing the constitutionality of the laws and providing a
model statute).
120
See infra Part III.A (discussing the constitutionality of the bans by analyzing whether
the bans are content-neutral, set reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, and are
not over-broad or vague).
121
See infra Part III.B (comparing the drafting in state bans to the speech-restrictive bans
from other contexts).
115
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and components may be problematic.122 Since the legislation passed,
roughly at the same time in many states and with little court precedent
to guide the legislatures, the lack of uniformity may cause some states
that exhibited poor drafting or more extreme measures to worry more
about their statute’s constitutionality.123 As precedent in other contexts
has highlighted, when restrictions are not carefully drafted or are too
extreme, they often are found unconstitutional.124
1.

State Funeral Protest Bans Must Be Content-Neutral

In order for state funeral protest bans to survive constitutional
challenges, they must be content-neutral.125 A content-neutral regulation
does not discriminate against or target specific speech and is viewpoint
and subject matter neutral.126 Despite generally having to meet a less
stringent standard, it is important for a state funeral protest ban to be
content-neutral since it would be unlikely for a court to find that such a
ban satisfied strict scrutiny if it was content-based.127
Paying some attention to the legislative intent behind these funeral
protest bans is helpful to the analysis as well.128 In particular, it is
necessary to determine whether the bans were created and directed
toward WBC and its message, or rather to protect funerals in general
from all protestors and demonstrations.129 The intent may impact

122
See generally supra Part II.B (discussing current state funeral protest bans); see also
Hudson, supra note 3 (noting that the following states have passed legislation: Alabama,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia and Wisconsin).
123
See supra notes 45-50 and 62-66 and accompanying text.
124
See supra notes 34 and 40-43 and accompanying text; see also Part II.D (discussing
similar speech restrictions in other protest contexts).
125
See supra Part II.C; see also supra notes 73-93 (laying the foundation for a First
Amendment analysis).
126
See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text. See generally Part II.C (providing a First
Amendment overview).
127
See supra note 121 and accompanying text. See generally Part II.C (First Amendment
analysis framework).
128
See supra note 116 and accompanying text. See generally Part II.C (setting a First
Amendment analysis framework).
129
See supra note 8; Associated Press 16414, supra note 24. WBC leader Fred Phelps told
the Kansas Senate Federal and State Affairs Committee, “[w]e can’t be lawfully moved out
of sight of our target audience. . . . You have no legitimate public interest here.” Associated
Press 16414, supra note 24.
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whether courts view the legislation as content-based.130 For example,
Governor Tom Vilsack of Iowa plainly stated, in regard to WBC, “[t]hese
protestors don’t reflect Iowa values, and their actions have no place in
our state.”131 Similarly, Kentucky stated in its statute that disrupting
military funerals was disgraceful and even warranted a declaration of
emergency.132 Despite arguments that the recent legislation targets the
WBC and its message, certain members of the U.S. Supreme Court have
stated that legislative intent is not determinative of whether a law is
content-neutral on its face.133 Although some of the bans were passed
unusually quickly in anticipation of an upcoming WBC protest, making
it easy to question the legislative intent, they have all been facially
content-neutral.134 Content-neutrality is key to any model statute, as it
allows for a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction.135
Although the impetus behind much, if not all, of the legislation has
been caused by WBC’s conduct of protesting funerals, and many
legislators and citizens have opposed WBC’s acts and message, courts

130
David L. Hudson, Jr., Pastor’s Anti-Gay Actions Test Society’s Commitment to First
Amendment, Oct. 16, 1998, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=9482
[hereinafter Hudson II] (last visited Sept. 4, 2006) (describing how Tom McCoy, Vanderbilt
law professor, stated at the time that WBC should have the right to express their message
and that it was a form of political speech, despite general public feeling that a funeral is not
an appropriate place). But see Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000) (noting that the law
was found content-neutral regardless of the triggering event). “Whether or not those
interests justify the particular regulation at issue, they are unquestionably legitimate.” Id.
131
Associated Press, supra note 32; see STARTRIBUNE, supra note 23 (stating that Minnesota
representative Seifert said that the WBC demonstrations were against Minnesota values).
132
Ky. H.R. 333. “Whereas there is a disgraceful nationwide campaign to disrupt
military funerals, and whereas this campaign may enter Kentucky at any time, an
emergency is declared to exist, and this Act takes effect upon its passage and approval by
the Governor or upon its otherwise becoming a law.” Id. at § 6.
133
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 637 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“To look for the
sole purpose of even a single legislator is probably to look for something that does not
exist.”) (emphasis in original); see also Chen, supra note 29 (“[T]he Court has repeatedly
rejected direct judicial inquiries into legislative motive, even where there is substantial
evidence that a facially neutral law might have been adopted for speech-restrictive
reasons.”). But see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(noting that, because the object of these ordinances was to suppress only one religion, the
laws were struck down by the Court despite their neutrality); Collins, supra note 3 (stating
that it is viewpoint-discrimination if the stated or actual purpose of the laws is to prohibit
groups like the Westboro Baptist Church, but not Patriot Guard Riders); Associated Press
16301, supra note 7 (citing Geoffrey Stone from University of Chicago Law School as saying
the Illinois law is unconstitutional because it is directed at the content of the speech and
singles out certain protests).
134
See Mundy, supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing the speed with which
many of these bans were enacted).
135
See infra Part IV (providing a model statute).
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generally look only to the statutory text to determine contentneutrality.136 Since most of the statutes prohibit all protesting and
demonstrations, creating a general ban, they will likely be determined to
be content-neutral.137 Nevertheless, the content-neutrality of these
funeral protest bans is still being questioned.138 In addition, any state
that allows some forms of demonstrations (like those of the Patriot
Guard Riders), but not others (like WBC demonstrations), will have a
hard time convincing a court that its regulation is content-neutral and an
even harder time convincing that same court that its statute meets strict
scrutiny.139
The majority of the funeral protest bans are content-neutral.140
Beginning with the Respect for Fallen Heroes Act, their terms do not
distinguish among different types of demonstrations and apply to all
protestors no matter what their message may be.141 However, even the
Fallen Heroes Act has a drafting weakness regarding contentneutrality.142 It states that no demonstrations can be carried out
according to the various regulations “unless the demonstration has been
approved,” and yet presents no guidelines on approval.143 This may lead
to some content-based decisions in the future and is a drafting weakness
that should be avoided by the states.144 Not taking after the weaknesses
in the federal Act, all of the states sampled in this Note used content136
See supra Part II.A (discussing the WBC and its tactics); see also supra Part II.C
(providing the framework for content-neutral regulations); supra note 123 and
accompanying text.
137
Phelps, supra note 3, at 290.
138
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 767 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“By confining the
law’s application to the specific locations where the prohibited discourse occurs, the State
has made a content-based determination.”); see also Hudson, supra note 3 (noting Richards’
statement, “[t]he other question I would have is what would happen if people who loved
the deceased held up signs outside the church or funeral home saying, ‘We love you. We’ll
miss you’ . . . Would those folks face criminal charges? If not, there’s a viewpoint-based
discrimination issue.”).
139
See Hudson, supra note 3 (stating that protection for a “grieving family” is not a
compelling government interest). But see Phelps, supra note 3, at 290 (stating that
protecting the right to worship is an important government interest). See generally supra
Part II.C.
140
See supra Part II.B (providing a sampling of current state funeral protest bans).
141
See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
142
See infra notes 144-45 (showing drafting weaknesses in the Fallen Heroes Act).
143
See 38 U.S.C. § 2413 (“No person may carry out – (1) a demonstration on the property
of a cemetery under the control of the National Cemetery Administration . . . unless the
demonstration has been approved by the cemetery superintendent or the director of the
property on which the cemetery is located.”).
144
See infra Part IV (providing a model statute based on analyzing strengths and
weaknesses in drafting).
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neutral language like “any person” or “any demonstration.”145 Contentneutrality is the first requirement in surviving a constitutional challenge,
and it seems as if most states have taken that first step correctly so as not
to cause a drafting weakness.146
2.

Bans Must Be Reasonable Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions

Crafting a content-neutral funeral protest ban that is a reasonable
time, place, and manner restriction is the best way to survive
constitutional scrutiny.147
A reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction must be content-neutral, advance a substantial government
interest, be narrowly tailored, and leave open alternative channels of
communication.148 A reasonable time, place, and manner status is
important, as courts overwhelmingly uphold such restrictions.149
State funeral protest bans can still be challenged under reasonable
time, place, and manner restriction analysis.150 For example, a statute
that is not narrowly tailored may fail this analysis.151 States like South
Dakota, with extreme distance requirements like 1,000 feet, or Kentucky,
which arguably regulates too much conduct, such as distributing
literature, may fail a narrowly tailored analysis because of these drafting
weaknesses.152 In addition, if a protest ban is not effective (either
because privacy rights are compromised or more speech than necessary
is restricted), it can be argued that its means do not meet its goals and,
See supra Part II.B (listing relevant state legislation).
See supra Part II.B (noting that Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Nebraska, Maryland,
Missouri and Ohio are examples of states using content-neutral language like “no person,”
“no demonstration,” and “no protest”); Wis. S. 525 (“No person . . . .”); Ohio H.R. 484
(“[N]o person shall picket or engage in protest activities . . . .”). However, some statutes
focus more on the intent to disrupt. See, e.g., N.J. A2870 and N.C. S. 1833 (allowing an
argument that non-disruptive supportive demonstrations would be excluded from the
bans). See Chen, supra note 29, at 46-47 (“If lawmakers wish to regulate a particular type of
constitutionally protected speech or speech-related conduct, they cannot openly identify
the object of their concern in the statute’s language.”).
147
See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.C; supra note 83.
148
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
149
See generally supra Part II.C (discussing First Amendment analysis about contentneutrality). But see Collins, supra note 134 (holding that reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions cannot be used because these restrictions discriminate on the content of the
message, and there is viewpoint-discrimination if the stated or actual purpose of the laws is
to prohibit groups like Westboro Baptist Church but not others like the Patriot Guard
Riders).
150
See supra Parts II.D-III.B (looking at how courts have judged reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions in other contexts).
151
See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
152
See supra notes 47, 50 (highlighting South Dakota and Kentucky statutes).
145
146

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 2 [2008], Art. 3

530

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

therefore, that it does not constitute a reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction.153 It will be important to courts in the future whether or not a
ban has been successful at eliminating the harm caused by WBC’s
funeral protests or, rather, if the ban inhibited WBC’s speech with no
benefits coming from the regulation.154 Finally, if a protest ban does not
leave open alternative channels of communication, it cannot be
considered a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction.155
Therefore, the statutes that encompass more activities under their
definitions of protest or picketing are more at risk, since they allow fewer
alternatives and may even run the risk of being considered overbroad.156
All of these examples highlight the importance of careful drafting that is
required to create a constitutional funeral protest ban.157
3.

Bans Cannot Be Overbroad or Vague

A speech regulation that is overbroad or vague can be challenged on
its face; if such a challenge is successful, the entire law is invalid.158
Thus, a state funeral protest ban must be narrow in scope and must
contain clear definitions and language so as not to be ruled
unconstitutionally vague.159 Unfortunately, balancing overbreadth and
content-neutrality when drafting legislation is very difficult.160
Since most of the protest bans prohibit any kind of speech or
demonstration at funerals, even positive forms of each, it can be argued
that the laws are too broad to survive constitutional scrutiny.161 For
example, demonstrations by the Patriot Guard Riders are not disruptive
and do not cause harm to grieving families, but they are still prohibited

See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
Associated Press 16779, supra note 32 (noting that a member of WBC told the Des
Moines Register that they would still come to Iowa, despite the law, but would honor the
distance requirements).
155
See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
156
See Ky. H.R. 333, supra note 50; see also infra notes 160-69; infra Part III.A.3 (discussing
overbreadth and vagueness weaknesses).
157
See infra Part IV (proposing a model statute based on drafting strengths and
weaknesses discussed).
158
See supra Part II.C (laying the foundation for a First Amendment analysis).
159
See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing vagueness weaknesses in drafting).
160
Chen, supra note 29, at 65.
161
Associated Press 16064, supra note 35 (explaining why Ronald K.L. Collins, a First
Amendment Center scholar in Virginia, believes it will be hard to apply a law in a contentneutral way without restricting those who want to show respect for the dead); Collins,
supra note 3 (stating that now you cannot be angry at or protest any dead person, even
people like Lee Harvey Oswald or John Wilkes Booth). This author suggests that perhaps
the decedents’ families be allowed to invite whomever they want.
153
154
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by the statutes.162 This example illustrates the problem of crafting a
protest ban that makes clear what types of protests are unlawful and the
side effects of prohibiting typically welcomed speech due to its
breadth.163 However, to attain content-neutrality, a level of broadness is
necessary.164 The statute’s constitutionality will ultimately depend on
how a court draws that line between content-neutrality and overbreadth.
Several state funeral protest bans have shown constitutional
weakness in the context of vagueness or over-breadth problems.165 For
example, Kansas’ original statute was deemed unconstitutionally vague
because of its time restrictions “before or after,” but recently the Kansas
legislature changed its statute to specify a time period from one hour
before to two hours after.166 Similarly, Missouri passed a second funeral
protest ban that changed the language “in front of or about” to 300 feet,
in fear of having its statute declared unconstitutionally vague.167
Kentucky’s vague time restriction prohibiting protests “at any time of
the day” and its far-reaching definition of protest activity may cause
vagueness and over-breadth problems in any upcoming lawsuits.168
Finally, South Dakota’s 1,000 foot distance restriction is in danger of
being held unconstitutionally overbroad, because it encompasses such a
large area and may regulate more speech than the Constitution allows.169
States with clear time restrictions will likely avoid this vagueness
problem.170
In contrast, Florida’s ban is brief and vague, including language such
as “interrupts.”171 Florida is unique in that most of the other statutes
162
See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing Patriot Guard Riders). See
generally notes 34-55 and accompanying text (revealing how various states’ laws prohibit
both friends and foes).
163
Collins, supra note 134 (statutes need to make clear what types of messages are
considered unlawful protest).
164
See supra Part III.B.3 (explaining how content-neutral regulations can be broad and
vague).
165
Kan. S. 421; MO. REV. STAT. § 578.501; see also supra notes 110-11.
166
Kan. S. 421.
167
See supra notes 66-68 and 72.
168
See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
169
McDonough, supra note 24, at 16 (commenting on how UCLA law professor Eugene
Volokh believes that principles underlying bans on picketing private residences could be
applied to funerals, but excessive distance requirements, which he believes regulate more
than 100 feet, would probably be unconstitutional); S.D. S. 156.
170
See supra notes 34-55 (providing examples of various state time restrictions).
171
Fla. H.R. 7127, supra note 46 and accompanying text (showing the bill’s vague distance
language).
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have clearly defined terms and distance and time requirements.172 For
example, Texas’ statute successfully avoids vagueness by clearly
defining every term.173 A model statute should define every term
succinctly and avoid vague language like that in Florida’s statute.174
Definitions are easy targets for findings of vague or overbroad
language because funeral protest bans differ in their definitions and
often have unique clauses.175 For instance, various definitions of the
word “funeral” exist.176 Kansas defines a “funeral” as any “ceremony,
procession or memorial service in connection with the death of a
person.”177 Indiana restricts protests for a funeral, procession, burial, or
viewing.178 Illinois includes any facility used for funeral services.179
Missouri extends the restriction to any place in which a funeral is held.180

See supra Part II.B (providing a sampling of current state legislation).
H.R. 97, 2006 Leg. (Tex. 2006), http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/793/billtext/
pdf/HB00097F.pdf. The definitions include:
(1) “Facility” means a building at which any portion of a funeral
service takes place, including a funeral parlor, mortuary, private
home, or established place of worship.
(2) “Funeral service” means a ceremony, procession, or memorial
service, including a wake or viewing, held in connection with the
burial or cremation of the dead.
(3) “Picketing” means:
(A) standing, sitting, or repeated walking, riding, driving, or other
similar action by a person displaying or carrying a banner, placard, or
sign;
(B) engaging in loud singing, chanting, whistling, or yelling, with or
without noise amplification through a device such as a bullhorn or
microphone; or
(C) blocking access to a facility or cemetery being used for a funeral
service.
(b) A person commits an offense if, during the period beginning one
hour before the service begins and ending one hour after the service is
completed, the person engages in picketing within 500 feet of a facility
or cemetery being used for a funeral service.
Id.
174
See supra Part IV (providing a model statute).
175
See supra notes 34-72, 160-68 and accompanying text.
176
See supra notes 34-72, 160-68 and accompanying text.
177
Kan. S. 421.
178
See IND. CODE § 35-45-1-3.
179
See Ill. Pub. Act 094-0772; see also Wis. S. 525 (defining funeral or memorial service as
a wake or burial, but excluding services that are “not intended to honor or commemorate
one or more specific decedents”).
180
See MO. REV. STAT. § 578.501 (defining funeral as the “ceremonies, processions and
memorial services held in connection with the burial or cremation of the dead”).
172
173
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“Protest” or “picketing” are also defined differently by the states.181
For example, Kansas defines picketing as “protest activities engaged in
by a person or persons stationed before or about a cemetery, mortuary,
church, or other location where a funeral is held or conducted.”182 Ohio
defines protest activities as “any action that is disruptive or undertaken
to disrupt or disturb a funeral or burial service or a funeral
procession.”183 Kentucky restricted even more activities, such as singing,
distributing literature, and interfering with access to a funeral.184 As
these examples illustrate, some statutes are more detailed than others,
have stricter restrictions than others, and ultimately may present more
constitutional concerns than others.185 A model statute needs to clearly
define its terms and avoid vague or overbroad language when providing
definitions.
4.

Public vs. Private Forums

Sidewalks and streets have traditionally been held to be public
forums.186 Although most funerals take place on private property,
protestors who have used public sidewalks and streets to voice their
messages are now being regulated in those public places.187 In effect,
state funeral protest bans have regulated speech on public property.188
This raises a constitutional concern, since:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of
the streets and public places has, from ancient times,
been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and
liberties of citizens.189

See supra notes 165, 167-68 and accompanying text.
Kan. S. 421.
183
Ohio H.R. 484.
184
Ky. H.R. 333.
185
Compare Fla. H.R. 7127, with other statutes in Part II.B, supra.
186
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000). Said the Court, “[T]he public sidewalks,
streets, and ways affected by the statute are ‘quintessential’ public forums for free speech.”
Id.
187
See generally supra Part II.A; Hudson, supra note 3 (arguing that sidewalks and streets
around funeral homes and churches are public and restricting speech on public space must
have a compelling interest that is lacking here).
188
See generally supra Part II.B (sampling current state legislation).
189
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
181
182
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Even so, government can still regulate speech in public forums, provided
the regulation is content-neutral and a reasonable time, place, and
manner restriction.190 Furthermore, recent case precedent suggests that
most government-owned properties will be considered non-public
forums.191 Government can regulate or even prohibit all speech in nonpublic forums as long as the regulation is viewpoint neutral and
reasonable.192 Therefore, it is possible to regulate speech activities in any
of the areas that the funeral bans encompass, whether or not they are
characterized as public forums or non-public forums, so long as the bans
are carefully and constitutionally crafted.193
As previously mentioned, a ban must be content-neutral, be a
reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, and not be vague or
overbroad.194 A state funeral protest ban that meets all of these
requirements has the best chance of surviving First Amendment
challenges.195 In order to illustrate the importance of these requirements
in drafting, the Note will next analyze similar speech restrictions in other
protest contexts.196
B. How Do These Funeral Protest Bans Compare To Similar Protest
Restrictions in Other Contexts?
Constitutional challenges to funeral protest bans are in their earliest
stages; thus, comparing these bans to similar protest restrictions in other
contexts will be helpful to this analysis and to predicting
constitutionality.197
As previously mentioned, several abortion,
See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at 1375 (“Unfortunately, especially as applied in recent
cases like Kokinda, Lee, and Forbes, it will be very difficult to find that any government
property is a public or limited public forum.”). But see Zick, supra note 91, at 581 (arguing
that recent First Amendment analysis concentrates on the speech that is being regulated
and often pays little or no attention to the place, allowing place to become a “powerful
weapon of social and political control”).
192
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at 1361.
193
Compare supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text, with Phelps, supra note 3
(explaining how restricting public areas near churches may raise concerns about the
separation of church and state).
194
See supra Parts III.A.1-3 and accompanying text.
195
See infra Part IV (offering a model statute).
196
See infra Part III.B (discussing court reasoning from speech restrictions in other
contexts).
197
See Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, No. 06-4156-CV-C-FJG, 2007 WL 273473 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 26,
2007); supra notes 66, 72 (involving a complaint alleging that Missouri statute sections
578.501 and 578.502 infringe on individual speech, religious liberty, and assembly rights);
Snyder v. Phelps, No. RDB-06-1389, 2006 WL 3081106 (D. Md. Oct. 30, 2006); supra notes 24,
29; Brian Goodman, Funeral Picketers Sued By Marine’s Dad, CBS News, July 28, 2006,
190
191
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residential picketing, and church-related cases dealing with time, place,
and manner restrictions on speech in public forums shed light on what a
court looks for, what restrictions it has declared unconstitutional, and
why.198 Unfortunately, determining whether a regulation is reasonable is
very contextual.199 Therefore, looking at the results and reasoning of
similar cases may help in crafting a constitutional funeral protest ban.200
In Hill v. Colorado, the Supreme Court upheld a statute regulating
speech within one hundred feet of an abortion clinic, as well as an eightfoot buffer zone surrounding individuals entering and leaving the clinic
as a valid time, place, and manner restriction.201 In its reasoning, the
Court found the regulation to be content-neutral and stressed that the
statute placed no limitations on the number of speakers, the noise level,
or the number, size, or text of images on the placards used by the
protestors.202 In addition, the Court acknowledged that the statute
required protestors to approach someone knowingly in order for a
violation to be upheld.203 However, it can be argued that funeral protest
laws are different from the sort of buffer zones created in Hill because
the former do not involve a right to access to health services and there is
no constitutional right to have a public funeral without protests.204
Additionally, the distance requirements were much lower in Hill than in
many state funeral protest bans.205 Despite that argument, Hill provides
an excellent roadmap for drafting a constitutional time, place, and
manner speech restriction.206

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/07/27/national/printable1843396.shtml
(last
visited Oct. 7, 2006) (explaining that Albert Snyder filed a lawsuit that claims WBC violated
his privacy, defamed him, and intentionally inflicted emotional distress when it targeted
his marine son’s funeral).
198
See supra Part II.D (discussing similar protest restrictions in other contexts).
199
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at 1357 (“Looked at together, all of these cases indicate
that the determination of whether a regulation is a reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction is entirely contextual.”).
200
See supra Part IV (laying out a model statute).
201
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719-20 (2000); supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
202
Hill, 530 U.S. at 726-27. The Court acknowledged that the statute applied to “all”
forms of protesting, counseling, and demonstrators whether or not they concerned abortion
or supported a certain stance. Id. at 726.
203
Id. at 720.
204
Id.
205
Collins, supra note 3. However, shorter distances also pose problems because privacy
is an important countervailing liberty interest to First Amendment freedoms. Id.
206
See supra Part IV (setting forth a model statute based in part on the reasoning in Hill).
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Other reasoning used in the cases previously examined may also be
distinguished.207 For instance, laws banning residential picketing are
arguably not applicable because the home is not involved in funeral
protest bans.208 Based on that sort of reasoning, it will be difficult to use
Frisby’s “captive audience” approach for support in defending a funeral
ban court challenge.209 In addition, it may be hard to apply the
secondary effects doctrine to state funeral protest bans as the Eighth
Circuit court did with the Olmer ordinance.210
The remaining cases previously discussed also shed light on how to
craft a model statute.211 Madsen and Schenck both serve as examples that
buffer zones will likely be upheld if they are a reasonable distance, such
as less than one hundred feet, and they are not floating.212 These cases
shed light on the issue by allowing us to see how the Court has analyzed
such content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions against
protestors.213
Finally, St. David’s and Olmer prove to be valuable examples
concerning churches and protestors.214 In St. David’s, a court upheld a
buffer zone against protestors around the church for thirty minutes
before and after services because the court recognized that citizens have
an interest in practicing their faith without interruptions.215 In Olmer, on
the other hand, the court struck down a very similar ordinance because it
prohibited more speech than was necessary in achieving its goal of
protecting children.216 Both of these examples show that a model statute
needs to make sure to convey the state’s interests clearly and be
narrowly tailored and crafted so as not to prohibit more speech than
See supra Part II.D (noting similar restrictions in other protest contexts).
Collins, supra note 3 (stating also that even absolute bans involving the home are
sometimes not upheld).
209
See supra notes 81-83, 161 and accompanying text; cf. Phelps, supra note 3, at 300-01
(describing how it may be possible to apply the Frisby “captive audience” test to churches,
because another court could find enough similarities, including that both are services
taking place at specific times and days requiring people to be there); Frisby v. Schultz, 487
U.S. 474 (1988); supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
210
Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 192 F.3d 1176 (8th Cir. 1999); supra notes 109-10 and
accompanying text; supra Part II.D; see also Phelps, supra note 3, at 307.
211
See supra Part II.D (providing an overview of speech restrictive bans in other protest
contexts).
212
See supra notes 95, 99-101 and accompanying text; cf. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703
(2000) (upholding an eight-foot floating buffer zone).
213
See infra Part IV (using this analysis in creating a model statute).
214
See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
215
See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
216
See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
207
208
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necessary when regulating funeral protests.217 The foregoing analysis of
restrictions in other contexts sheds light on how to best craft a
constitutional funeral protest ban.218
IV. CONTRIBUTION
Despite the importance of First Amendment political speech rights,
state bans have been favoring the privacy rights of the deceased and
their families in the context of funeral settings.219 As these funeral bans
continue to differ and are eventually challenged in court, the sensitivity
attached to First Amendment speech rights will require a careful crafting
of such restrictions and bans if they are to stand up to constitutional
challenges.220 This Part will address whether striking a certain balance of
rights or certain phrasing in a model statute can make legislation more
likely to withstand future court challenges. In order to test constitutional
challenges, a model statute based off of comparing current legislation
See infra Part IV (providing a model statute).
See supra Parts II.B, III.D; see also Carrie L. Johnson, Comment, Unwanted Speech and the
State’s Interest in Protecting Religious Free Exercise: Drawing First Amendment Lines in Olmer
v. City of Lincoln, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 423, 471 (2001). Johnson states:
To follow Hill, the Lincoln City Council would draft its ordinance to
make it unlawful for one individual to approach within eight feet of
another individual without their consent for purposes of oral protest,
education, counseling, or leaflet passing when within one hundred feet
of a building used for religious purposes. To make the ordinance more
narrowly tailored to its interest, the Lincoln City Council could follow
its previous model and ban such activities only during “scheduled
religious activities.”
Johnson, supra; see also Phelps, supra note 3, at 310-12 (1999) (arguing that to construct a
valid ban on church picketing, the best interests are protecting children, as in Olmer, or
protecting religious privacy, as long as it does not violate the Establishment Clause, that
ample alternative communication channels should not be a problem; that narrow tailoring
is the hardest requirement to meet, and that, as said by the dissent in Frisby, coercive
aspects of picketing bans should be eliminated, including regulations on group numbers,
noise levels, and hours as opposed to the government being inactive or overbroad).
219
See supra Part II.B (discussing current state funeral protest bans); see also Phelps, supra
note 3, at 288-89 (“The Court is troubled by the notion that a person may be subjected to
focused picketing at their place of worship. Indeed, the right to engage in quiet and
reflective prayer without being subjected to unwarranted intrusion is an essential
component to freedom of religion.”); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715-16 (“It is also
important when conducting this interest analysis to recognize the significant difference
between state restrictions on a speaker’s right to address a willing audience and those that
protect listeners from unwanted communication.”).
220
Hudson II, supra note 125 (citing McCoy, who believes that reasonable time, place and
manner restrictions to protect privacy rights, if applied neutrally, would likely survive
constitutional challenges and who also stated, “[t]he true test of free speech is whether we
tolerate political ideas which we all consider offensive. I mean, the ideas which we agree
on do not need protection.”).
217
218
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and protesting precedents from other contexts needs to be addressed and
laid out. The model statute consists of compiling strongly drafted
sections of current state legislation (those sections that are likely to
survive a court challenge), and then further enhances those sections to
create a constitutional funeral protest ban.
A. Components of a Model Statute
A model funeral protest ban must be content-neutral, a reasonable
time, place, and manner restriction, neither vague nor overbroad in its
terms or what activity it encompasses, limited to public places, leave
open alternative channels of communication, and draw upon the rulings
of the courts in the abortion, residential picketing, and prior churchrelated rulings. The model statute cannot target the WBC or any other
similar group on its face. If it did specifically enumerate groups, the
statute would be subject to heightened scrutiny and would likely fail
strict scrutiny. Similarly, if not equally enforced among all those who
disturb a funeral, whether it is the WBC or Patriot Guard Riders,
challengers may argue that the legislative purpose is in fact
discriminatory. To be a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction,
the model statute must not only be content-neutral but also have clear
time and distance restrictions. The more extreme time and distance
restrictions are, the less constitutional they will be.221
Finally, if terms are unclear or the statute is crafted too broadly, it
will likely fail a court challenge. A model statute should keep its
distance requirements to 300 feet or less, its time restrictions as closely
related to the time of the service as possible, and clearly provide
timeframes quantitatively, while prohibiting only as much speech as
necessary to preserve the privacy and sanctity of the service. As the
Kentucky and Missouri statutes face court challenges already, it is clear
that using language describing the time restrictions as “any time”
instead of setting a concrete amount or having backup legislation in
anticipation of a constitutional violation will place a target on a state’s
funeral protest ban.222

221
See S.D. S. 156, at § 3 (describing South Dakota’s 1,000 foot restriction); Fla. H.R. 7127
(providing only vague language about distance); Collins, supra note 3 (arguing that a
greater distance lessens the effectiveness of protests).
222
See Ky. H.R. 333.
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B. Model Statute
The Model Statute will borrow from only the most strongly drafted
sections of legislation previously discussed and will further amend and
enhance them. To start, the Model Statute would benefit from a very
clear and concise purpose statement, much like the one in Oklahoma’s
statute. Next, the conduct prohibited at funerals needs to be clearly
defined and given a time restriction. Kentucky’s statute does a thorough
job of this and is the best model. Also, clear distance and time
restrictions need to be set. Illinois sets a distance requirement of 200 feet
and is overtly clear about which and from where services are protected
within this buffer zone, making its statute an appropriate model.
Finally, penalties for violating such a statute need to be given. The
proposed Model Statute is as follows:223
(a) It is generally recognized that families have a
substantial interest in organizing and attending funerals,
which also includes wakes, memorial services, or burials for
deceased relatives.224
(b) A person is guilty of interference with a funeral,
which also includes a wake, memorial service, or burial when
he or she, at any time on any day from one hour prior to,
during, and one hour after:
(1) Blocks, impedes, inhibits, or in any other
manner obstructs or interferes with access into
or from any building or parking lot of a building
in which a funeral, wake, memorial service, or
burial is being conducted, or any burial plot or
the parking lot of the cemetery in which a
funeral, wake, memorial service, or burial is
being conducted;
(2) Congregates, pickets, patrols, demonstrates,
or enters on that portion of a public right-of-way
or private property; or
(3) Without authorization from the family of the
deceased or person conducting the service,
during a funeral, wake, memorial service, or
223
The proposed statute is composed of sections from various state funeral protest bans
and this compilation is the contribution of the author.
224
Okla. S. 1020. The proposed additions to the section are italicized and are the
contribution of the author.
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burial: Sings, chants, whistles, shouts, yells, or
uses a bullhorn, auto horn, sound amplification
equipment, or other sounds or images
observable to or within earshot of participants in
the funeral, wake, memorial service, or burial.225
(c) Such conduct is prohibited within 200 feet of any
ingress or egress of that funeral, which also includes a
wake, memorial service, or burial site. For purposes of this
Section:
(1) “Funeral” means the ceremonies, rituals,
processions, and memorial services held at a
funeral site in connection with the burial,
cremation, or memorial of a deceased person.
(2) “Funeral site” means a church, synagogue,
mosque, funeral home, mortuary, cemetery,
gravesite, mausoleum, or other place at which a
funeral is conducted or is scheduled to be
conducted within the next 30 60 minutes or has
been conducted within the last 30 60 minutes.226
(d) “A person who violates this section is guilty of a
misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to
imprisonment not exceeding 90 days or a fine not
exceeding $1,000 or both.
In addition, subsequent
violations may lead to more severe fines not exceeding $5,000
or imprisonment not exceeding 120 days.227
C. Commentary on the Proposed Model Statute
The proposed Model Statute incorporates parts from various,
already ratified funeral protest bans. In each section, the drafting was
enhanced to cover different types of services connected with death, as
well as to include specific timeframes everywhere in the statute. The
compilation utilized aspects from various statutes with strong drafting
likely to withstand a First Amendment challenge. Most statutes are
already similar to this model and seem likely to be upheld. The key
225
See Ky. H.R. 333. The proposed amendments and additions are italicized or stricken
with a line and are the contribution of the author.
226
See Ill. Pub. Act 094-0772. The proposed amendments and additions are italicized and
are the contribution of the author.
227
See Md. H.R. 850. The proposed additions to the section are italicized and are the
contribution of the author.
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components and constitutional weaknesses of most laws of this type,
however, lie in extreme distance and time restrictions, vague language,
and content-based language. If a funeral protest ban can pass those
elements, it is likely to remain on the books. If funeral protest bans
follow this pattern, courts will likely find them to be a constitutional way
to protect the privacy of grieving families.
V. CONCLUSION
The WBC and its controversial funeral protests have sparked a
complex constitutional dispute nation-wide. Protecting speech is crucial,
as is providing grieving families with privacy and honoring the dead,
especially those that have died while serving our country. Regardless of
a person’s stance on homosexuality, war, funerals, or the appropriate
reach of the First Amendment, the recently proposed and passed state
funeral protest bans will continue to be passed in states and eventually
challenged in court. The proposed model statute seeks to strike the
appropriate balance of rights and highlight drafting techniques to benefit
states that have yet to propose such a bill as well as legislatures that may
be forced to redraft their current statutes in the near future.
Although most state protest bans will likely withstand constitutional
scrutiny, a funeral protest ban will be most successful if it is contentneutral, a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, contains clearly
defined terms, is not vague or overbroad, sets reasonable distance and
time requirements and punishments, and is equally enforced among all
groups.
All of these components are necessary, as previous
constitutional analysis and similar restrictions in other contexts
discussed herein illustrate. Despite other options, such as using the tort
system, with the right clarity, reasonableness, and drafting, funeral
protest bans can be crafted constitutionally and provide the best answer
to any conflict of constitutional rights. Furthermore, strong public
support for their passage thus far makes it even more likely that, despite
future court challenges and possible redrafting, legislatures will work
hard to keep these statutes on the books.
This issue presents a patriotic paradox: WBC spreading its message
through its right to protest, legislatures following the will of the public
and passing statutes with constitutional concerns, and, finally, soldiers
who died protecting the freedoms of this country, among them the First
Amendment. Although the Free Speech clause can be viewed as
promoting tolerance and necessary to the exchange of ideas, it raises
emotional responses when put into a funeral context that may
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overshadow free speech rights if not drafted carefully.
remember the warning from Texas v. Johnson:

We must

The way to preserve the flag’s special role is not to
punish those who feel differently about these matters. It
is to persuade them that they are wrong
....
We can imagine no more appropriate response to
burning a flag than waving one’s own, no better way to
counter a flag burner’s message than by saluting the flag
that burns. . . . We do not consecrate the flag by
punishing its desecration, for in doing so we dilute the
freedom that this cherished emblem represents.228
For those who are grieving a loved one at a funeral and are
disrupted by the WBC and its protests, placards, and lyrics that began
this Note, it will no doubt be difficult to remember the First Amendment,
respect the speech rights of the protestors, favor the ideals that your
loved one died for over privacy at his or her funeral, and understand the
constitutional concerns that surround the situation. State funeral protest
bans, if drafted carefully, can successfully balance the competing rights
in this patriotic paradox.
Kara Beil229

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419-20 (1989).
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